



Toward the beginning of Tolstoy's long story The Death of Ivan
Ilych, one of Ivan's lawyer friends goes to the dead magistrate's home
to express condolences. Looking upon Ivan's body as it lies in its
coffin, the visitor seems to see in Ivan's face "a reproach and warning
to the living." Discomforted, he treats the warning as "not applicable
to him," and is delighted to see another of Ivan's lawyer friends, a
"playful, well-groomed, and elegant figure" whose refreshing appear-
ance suggests that he is "above all these happenings and would not
surrender to any depressing influences. ' Ivan's two friends whisper
an agreement to meet for a bridge game later in the evening, their
whispers sounding one of the story's repeating themes: how we back
away from death, treating it as separate from life and unconnected to
ourselves until it is upon us.
I recalled the great Tolstoy story when I read the recent issue of
the Harvard Law Review containing seven short articles under the
title In Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly.2 Henry Friendly, who died
in March 1986, was among the very greatest federal judges of this
century, and at his death he was still actively engaged in the work of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The group
of men who memorialized him - Bruce Ackerman, Wilfred Feinberg,
Paul Freund, Erwin Griswold, Louis Loss, Richard Posner, and Todd
Rakoff - includes some of the leading names in American law. Their
essays generally did not focus on Judge Friendly's contributions to
specific areas of law; rather, most were more personal. That is what
makes one omission from these articles particularly striking: none of
the seven alluded to the fact that Judge Friendly killed himself.
As someone who deeply admired this brilliant scholar-judge, I had
been shaken by the newspaper reports of his suicide. After finishing
the Review's memorial tribute, I felt an enormous gap: a large and
important matter had been left out, and it seemed that perhaps some-
thing important was revealed by that omission. This is the subject
of my reflections here. I do not at all mean to criticize any of the
individuals who contributed to the Review's tribute, each of whom
superbly captured important aspects of Judge Friendly's life and ca-
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98-99 (Signet Classic ed. ig6o).
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reer. But I want to suggest why there might also have been a place
in this memorial for some mention of the subject of suicide.
There are undoubtedly reasons to think that the subject should be
avoided altogether. To mention the suicide might, for example, risk
diminishing the rest of what is said, making the final act of an
extremely large life seem like the preeminent one. In addition, some
might avoid mentioning the subject because they believe that suicide
offends a religious prohibition, or is against the law, or is at least an
embarrassment - evidence of weakness, irrationality, or family fail-
ure, or a lurid twist of plot in an otherwise refined life of the mind.
Etiquette, then, or a sense of human delicacy, might counsel silence.
3
Perhaps most obviously, it might be thought that the subject of suicide
simply has no relevance to the occasion at hand - any more than a
clinical account of a great person's fatal illness or accident.
But there are also reasons to think that the subject has a place in
the public reflections about Judge Friendly. Presumptively, the man-
ner of his death was continuous with his life - indeed, it was a part
of his life. I do not say that suicide is heroic, but it is not by definition
an embarrassment. It can be expressive of a deeply rational man.
Judge Friendly was eighty-two years old, with a life of enormous
achievement behind him. His wife of fifty-four years had died a year
earlier, and he had become virtually blind. His life had been one of
reason and mind - reading, thinking, and writing - realms of
activity that he controlled. (He had always done his own work,
former law clerk Bruce Ackerman reported. 4) For such a man -
terribly diminished by untransformable losses, and for whom life had
always meant excellences on his own terms - suicide could become
a rational choice. Planned weeks ahead, as I am told it was, Henry
Friendly's death may well have been the product of the same delib-
erate, controlling, and reasoning self that guided the rest of his life,
a product of some of the same attributes that yielded his achievements.
In any event, Henry Friendly chose it, as no other great judge or
lawyer I know of has done. That action became part of his unique-
ness. My point here is not to give a particular account of his suicide,
for I am certainly not the one to do that. My point is only to suggest
that the manner of his death may be relevant to a complete under-
standing of his life, including his professional life, and therefore may
be relevant in memorializing him. There may in the end be good
reasons to avoid the subject, as I have suggested above, but we must
3 Until recent years, newspaper obituaries generally avoided mentioning suicide as the cause
of a person's death. Reflecting the more modern practice, however, the New York Times obituary
called Judge Friendly's death "apparently a suicide," N.Y. Times, Mar. i2, I986, at B6, col. 1;
and a later news article about a memorial service for Judge Friendly stated that he had decided
"to end his own life." N.Y. Times, June io, 1986, at B4, col. 6.
4 See Ackerman, In Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly, supra note 2, at 1709-Il.
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guard against another possibility: To back off from the awesome
subject of suicide may be an evasion, a refusal to face death's link to
life, an unwillingness to confront the full force of Henry Friendly's
reasoning self. Through such avoidance, we may miss a fundamental
element of Judge Friendly's humanity and also miss something rele-
vant in understanding Judge Friendly's achievements - indeed, some-
thing relevant to all of us.
In penning even these words here, I acknowledge that I have felt
some awkwardness and some uncertainty about the wisdom of my
effort, for the subject seems so delicate. But I am also moved by two
overriding beliefs: that law's terrain (and the lawyer's terrain) must
be the realities of life, in all their tangled complexity; and, further,
that we almost always pay a price when lawyers ignore the humanity
of their subjects. This contributes to my sense that there should be
a place for Judge Friendly's suicide in our public reflections, just as
there is a place for the rest of what his life of the mind produced. If
we do not yet have a language or mode for discussing these matters
in the law reviews, we should try to develop one.
I have wondered, in fact, whether the gap in the Law Review's
memorial reveals something distinctive about lawyers. Surely it does
not reveal something unique to lawyers. People from every walk of
life may have any or all of the reasons noted above for retreating
from death's many forms, including suicide; Tolstoy's story surely has
a universal impulse, even though Ivan Ilych and his friends are law-
yers. Yet it is fair to ask whether we as lawyers may be more likely
than many others to distance ourselves from death's emotional force.
For lawyers, death becomes a professional subject: lawyers write wills,
administer estates, discuss insurance implications, analyze "wrongful
death" as a legal category. We formalize death as part of our profes-
sional lives, and we become accustomed to pushing aside death's more
human dimensions. Indeed, this is true of most subjects that lawyers
address. We have our own rather abstract language and doctrines for
approaching human problems, and our professional training and cul-
ture encourage detachment as a frame of mind.
More fundamentally, lawyers divide life into the "professional" and
the "personal." Activities, other people, one's self - all are divided.
Only certain very limited subjects or ways of speaking are deemed
appropriate for one's professional voice. I am not certain why the
division occurs, but part of the explanation must be that lawyers
practice being agents and not principals. Lawyers always remind each
other and the general public that what a lawyer says in a client's
name is not .necessarily the lawyer's personal view; indeed, this can
be seen as a corollary to the lawyer's ethical obligation to represent
even the most unpopular clients and causes. Aspects of the lawyer's
role that separate the "professional" from the "personal" can contribute
to a submergence of the lawyer's .self, a reticence about expressing
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feeling in a professional setting, and a disregard of complex and
nuanced realities that don't fit into neat legal categories - leading
lawyers, and law itself, to become distant from the life that is their
necessary subject. Such tendencies within our professional culture
may be reinforced by the personalities of those typically drawn to it.
In this world where the "professional" and the "personal" are
sharply split, we seldom see or explore relationships between the two
spheres. Writing about Henry Friendly in the Harvard Law Review
is clearly "professional" and is about "professional" matters. Even
when a contributor explicitly describes his essay as "personal," there
is no mention of the inner life. It should therefore not surprise us if
lawyers assume that suicide lacks relevant meaning in this professional
setting. I cannot really answer the question whether we in the legal
profession are more likely than others to evade or distance ourselves
from the subject of death. But I am quite certain that such avoidance
diminishes the humanity and the reality of our subjects, diminishes
our public discourse, and ultimately diminishes ourselves. Evading
death, we diminish life.
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